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I. INTRODUCTION

Access to telecommunication services has been increasingly
acknowledged to set the threshold for citizens' participation in the
democratic process, economic marketplace, as well as social and cultural
activities that enrich their life quality. As an integral component of
telecommunication policy emerging out of the interaction of political,'
economic,2 social,3 and technological forces,4 universal service casts direct
impact on the citizens' ideal of equal access to knowledge and
information.
1. On a political ground, it is desirable that people have access to telecommunication
facilities in order to be informed, exchange opinions or to exercise their political rights. BOBJOSEPH
MATHEW, THE WTO AGREEMENTS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS 176 (2003).

2. Economic arguments arise from the existence of network externalities and the link
between telecommunication development and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increase. Id.
(addressing the externalities of communication network). See also MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE
POLICY-ENHANCING THE PROCESS THROUGH MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION 3 (Barbara A.

Cherry et al. eds., 1999) (discussing telecommunication development and economic increase).
3. MATHEW, supra note 1 (arguing that social rationale for universal service tries to avoid
the gap between informed and not-informed groups).
4. It is widely recognized that universal service closely relates with technological
innovations in terms of definition, scope and accomplishing channels. See infra Part III.C
(technologic choices and universal service).

TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN CHINA: MAKING THE GRADE

While its economic boom in recent decades has triumphantly raised
living standards for a great fraction of the population,5 China is still
confronted with the digital divide,6 a disharmonious signal in information
society. Relevantly, China has been skyrocketing itself to the fastestgrowing telecommunication market across the globe, with the largest
telecommunication network, the largest amount of fix-line, cellular phone
subscribers7 and the second-largest number of Internet users (the United
States having the highest).' Despite this trajectory of growth in sheer size
and market potential, penetration rate of telecommunication service in
China remains low.9 This carries over to an astounding imbalance in
natural conditions and economic development among different regions.'0
Statistically, the penetration rate of fix-line and mobile in Eastern China
is, on average, double than that in Central and Western China, with the
lowest, or even no penetration, rate in some outlying rural regions. 1
5. See THE STATE COUNCIL LEADING GROUP OF OFFICE FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN CHINA'S RURAL AREAS
HISTORICAL PROCESS (2004), http://en.cpad.gov.cn/ item/2004-05-24/50006.html.
6. The "digital divide" is described as "the divide between those with access to new
technologies and those without." NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
(NTIA), FALLING THROUGH THE NET: DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1999) (Introduction)

[hereinafter NTIA], http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/FTTN. pdf. In the case of China, the
digital divide can be identified from three aspects: digital divide between China and other countries;
digital divide among different regions in China and digital divide between the urban and rural areas.
The last two categories are to be discussed in this Article.
7. By the end of 2007, China had 912.835 million telephone subscribers with mobile users
topping at 547.286 million and fix-line users at 365.449 million. China's telecommunications sector
earned revenue of over RMB 728.01 billion (US$ 97 billion) in 2007, a year-on-year rise of 10.9%.
The Ministry of Information Industry (Mii), China Communication Industry Main Indicators: Dec.
2007 n.8 (2008) [hereinafter MII, China Communication Industry], http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2008/
01/31/art_166_36019.html.
8. By the end of 2007, China has 210 million Internet users, a year-on-year rise of 53.3%
(87 million). CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER (CNNIC): THE 21 TH STATISTICS
REPORT ON CHINA INTERNET NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 10 (2007) [hereinafter CNNIC],
http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2008/1/ 7/104156.pdf.
9. By the end of 2007, there are 27.8 fix-lined phones, 41.6 mobile phones for every 100
inhabitants in China. M11, China Communication Industry, supra note 7. By the end of 2007, the
penetration rate of the Internet was 16% in China. CNNIC, supra note 8, at 11. Compare
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU): ICT STATISTICS DATABASE,
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#, for a comprehensive statistics on
telecom indicators of over 200 economies.
10. The physiognomy of China is formed into three ladders, descending from west to east
with diversified terrains. China's economic development is accordingly divided into three regions,
i.e., Eastern (10 provinces), Central (9 provinces), and Western China (12 provinces). The Eastern
China is on average better developed while the Central and Western China lag far behind.
11. For statistics on penetration rate in each province, indicating geographic disparities and
demographics of subscribers, see MII: The Fix-line and Mobile Subscribers in Different Provinces
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Similarly, a noticeable gap of Internet development exists between urban
and rural China. 2
The affordable access of all Chinese people to telecommunication
services is of extreme significance in the sense that telecommunications
can both empower and threaten a regime.' 3 As an indispensable segment
of constructing a "harmonious society," the most frequently-echoed
developmental theme since late 2002, universal service has been paid more
attention in China. Nevertheless, carrying universal service into practice
poses various formidable challenges as a result of China's unique natural
conditions 4 and a daunting rural-urban wealth differential. 5 Meanwhile,
the debates on universal service have been particularly contentious and
perplexing in China, given regulatory reform toward competitive provision
of telecommunication service during China's post-WTO epoch and
technological advancements in the broadband era. These two elements, if
handled inappropriately, may trigger more spatial inequality.
Against this backdrop, this Article focuses on a central issue on how
China should craft its universal service mechanism to fit well into both
intrinsic demands and extrinsic challenges. Taking up this task, this Article
attempts to identify several core issues that should be considered in
devising a feasible system, centering on how such promoters of teledensity as regulatory reform, foreign participation and technological
innovations are able to function together to bridge the digital gap.
This Article proceeds as follows: After a brief historical review and
summary of universal service bifurcated into monopolistic stage and
andAreas: December2007, http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2008/01/31/art_166_36022.html(last visited
Feb. 1, 2008).
12. In June 2007, the netizen population ofrural China reached 37.41 million and the Internet
penetration rate reached 5.1%; the netizen population in urban areas reached 125 million, with the
penetration rate reaching 21.6%. See CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER (CNNIC),
SURVEY REPORT ON INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL CHINA 4 (2007), http://www.cnnic.cn/
download/2007/2007_SurveyReport on InternetDevelopment inRuralChina2007.pdf.
13. See L. KWABENA RIVERSON, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENTS: THE CASE OF
AFRICA 16 (University Presso of America 1993) (arguing that widely available telecommunications
affects governance and rule of law). See also John Ure, China's Telecommunications:Options and
Opportunities, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT INCHINA 245, 248 (Paul S.N. Lee
ed., 1997) (pointing out the gap between telecom rich and telecom poor is a situation ripe for
political instability).
14. As a vast developing country, China consists of 31 provinces, 56 ethnic minorities and
a total population of over 1.3 billion among which around 60% resides in the countryside. There
are numerous different languages, cultural traditions, and local loyalties to meld together adding
more complexities to law enforcement. See Ure, supra note 13, at 248-49.
15. In China, ever-widening urban-rural gap has drawn intensive public concerns in recent
years, especially as the economic reform continues to unfold and deepen. See Jun Xia & Ting-jie
Lu, UniversalServicePolicy in China:BuildingDigitalServiceforRuralCommunity, unpublished
conference paper (on file with author), Sept. 23, 2005, at 7-8.

2008]

TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN CHINA: MAKING THE GRADE

119

competitive period, Part IIdelineates the status quo of universal service in
China, featuring the implementation, achievements and pitfalls of the
Village Access Project (VAP). Subsequently, Part III analyses the
objective of universal service, the potential impact of foreign participation
on universal service and technologic choice. This part tries to demonstrate
that a changing landscape in China requires a compatible change in some
critical ideas regarding the establishment of a pragmatic universal service
framework. Part IV touches upon several components in designing a
workable financing mechanism for telecom operators to fulfill their
universal service obligations (USO). This part features universal service
fund (USF) and underscores the necessity, feasibility and difficulties in the
contribution and distribution of the Fund.
II. A HISTORICAL SNAPSHOT AND THE STATUS QUO
China's telecommunication service sector, in its modem sense, has
undergone a series of changes since the 1980s: the highly planned and
monopolistic stage, loosening controls on price and deregulation,
preliminary break-up of monopoly and introduction of competition,
institutional restructuring and to the current six-operators-dominated
competitive pattern as a consequence of "north-south splitting" in late
2001.6 The implementation of universal service roughly went in tandem
with these developments and can be divided into a monopolistic period
and a competitive era with respective traits.
A. Monopolistic Period: UniversalService Through CrossSubsidization
In an economic sense, provision of universal service incurs net costs for
the provider, which ought to be appropriately compensated.17 The funding
for universal service, based on various experience in various jurisdictions,
can derive from a number of sources, including internal crosssubsidization and USF.
Prior to 1994, China Telecom (CT), the first state monopoly of
telecommunication service, established directly under Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications (MPT) in 1949, was the sole basic
telecommunication operator in China. In 1994, signaling the debut of
16. See Kang Rui & Feng Xiaoju, A Challenge to EmergingEconomies: New Competition
PatternsRequired in the TelecommunicationsIndustry-The Caseof ChinaAfter Its Entry Into the
WTO, 36 INT'L LAW. 1173, 1176 (2002) (giving a detailed account of historical evolution of
China's telecommunication service sector).
17. See Stuart Buck, TELRIC vs. Universal Service: A Takings Violation?,56 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1, 31-32 (2003).
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market competition, the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) created the
second state-owned operator-China Unicorn. Another operator, Jitong
Telecom also was set up by over ten large state-owned enterprises in the
same year. These two competitors, however, faced an uphill battle in their
early stages and were hardly true rivals to CT.'"
During this monopolistic period, universal service heavily relied upon
the favorable fiscal policy granted by the government to CT and CT's
internal cross-subsidization mechanism. On the one hand, China carried
out mandated pricing controls effectively requiring consumers in low cost
areas to bear the cost of providing services to high cost consumers. On the
other hand, as the sole telecom operator, CT indeed undertook an informal
USO by utilizing the large tariffs gap among different service types or
different regions to cross-subsidize rural phone services. For example, CT
charged business phone users a higher rate or added a surcharge to urban
users' phone bills to fund services in rural areas. In the meantime, in order
to enable CT to provide basic telephony for rural communities, the MPT
authorized CT to charge a high initial access fee, another method of crosssubsidization, to raise capital for its rural network expansion. 9 Availing
itself of these measures, China witnessed a period of rapid growth in rural
telecommunication coverage, most notably from 1995 through 1997.20
B. Competition Era: UniversalService through Village Access
Project(VAP)
1. Phasing out of Cross-subsidization
Despite its effectiveness, the cross-subsidization mechanism is
traditionally used in monopolistic era and fundamentally at odds with
market competition.2 As WTO accession loomed, China stepped up to
transform its telecommunication sector from a monopoly-based scheme
into a market-driven orientation. First, the Ministry of Information
18. Rachael Abramson, CatchingFlieswith Chopsticks: China'sStrategicLeapinto Wireless
Telecommunications, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 21, 20 (2002).
19. Initial access charge existed for 20 years from 1980 to 2001 in China. Before July 1,
2001, the initial access charge for a fix-phone could be as high as 5000 Yuan (over 620 US$) in
some cities. The abolishment of initial access charge signified the end of a telecommunication
development model in China and was marked as a milestone in China's telecom history. See, e.g.,
Qin Li, AbolishinglnitialAccessCharge,Nov. 15,2002, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/
252/8956/8964/20021115/867661 .html.
20. During this period, the annual growth of rural connections reached over 10% supported
by cross-subsidization ofCT. See Tao Lin et al., UniversalService Obligationsin China's Telecom
Sector: Situations,Reforms and Implementation, May 2002 (unpublished research report, on file
with author), at 16-18.
21. THOMAs G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PoLIcY 349-50 (1998).
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Industry (MU) was established as the regulator of the communication
sector in 1998. Second, the former CT was separated from MPT and
transformed into a market-oriented group company that same year. Third,
several rounds of consolidation and restructuring of telecom operators,
particularly the restructuring of the former CT, were launched by the
MI. 22 Following these reforms, the pattern of market competition with six
players has basically taken shape in China's basic telecommunication
service sector. 23 The story does not reach curtain call, however, when a
new round of restructuring with the deployment of 3G and full-service
license issuance is allegedly in the pipeline.24
Alongside with the emergence of competition and further removal of
initial access charge as the corollary of telecommunication reform, crosssubsidization gradually became unsustainable.2 ' The new CT, frustrated by
the tremendous business loss incurred by providing telephone services to
rural areas, slowed down its step in rural networks investment after 1998.
The annual growth of rural connection resultingly plummeted from 10%
to 2%.26 More to this point, when competition became more extensive,
cross-subsidization was in peril of being squeezed out of the rate structure
inch by inch.27 This urged China to devise an economically sensible
mechanism to accomplish universal service. Early in 1998, the MU
embarked on a USF initiative in an effort to subsidize rural
telecommunication networks. The establishment of USF was ever
officially mentioned in 2001 by the State Council as an approach to reform
universal service framework and accelerate economic development in the

22. In 1999, CT was first divided into four operators that specialize in different types of
services. See Mari Pangestu & Debbie Mrongowius, TelecommunicationServices in China:Facing
the Challenges of WTO Accession, Dec. 9, 2002, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/panmron-telecom.pdf. Thereafter on Dec. 11,2001, the date when
China entered into the WTO, the State Council approved the scheme of second splitting of the
former CT along Yangtze River into two parts. See Jingxia Shi, Telecommunication Service in
China: Implicationsfrom WTO Membership, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE (Geneva) 585-87
(2004) (discussing government-drive market competition from 1994-2002 in China). See also
Abramson, supra note 18, at 19-22.
23. They are: after-restructured China Telecom, China Netcom, China Mobile, China
Unicorn, China Railcom, and China Satcom. None of them owns over 50% of market share,
indicating that competition is fierce to a large degree. With regard to some basic facts and figures
of six operators, see Abramson, supra note 18, at 19-25.
24. See infraPart III.C, (3)-3G License Issuance and Universal Service, with accompanying
footnotes.
25. See Martyn Taylor, Reforming China's Telecommunication Laws: Lessons from the
Australian Experience?,7 INT'L J.CoMM. L. & POL'Y 10-18 (2002/2003).
26. See Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 8.
27. See generally STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
631-32 (2001).
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Western China.28 But the plan thus far has failed to come into fruition
partly because of the different opinions held by MU and the Ministry of
Finance (hereinafter "MOF"). Their divergent opinions focus on such
intractable issues as the collection basis, the operational standards, and the
regulation agency of USF,2 9 and exemplify a bureaucratic conflict of
interests and difficulties to coordinate among government ministries.
2. Village Access Project (VAP) as a Makeshift
Without an explicit support mechanism reconciling universal service
with competitive markets, MU had to take a makeshift (or stopgap) by
launching the Village Access Project (VAP) in early 2004, when the
deadline for fulfilling 95% penetration rate of village telephone as
pronounced in the tenth Five-Year National Economic Development
Plan.3 ° Six operators were assigned the tasks, based on their revenues and
geographical locations of their networks, to carry out USO in designated
provinces within the following two years.3"
By the end of 2005, there were 732.7 thousand rural administrative
villages consisting of 5 million natural villages, with rural households of
210 million and rural population of over 745 million in China.32 In areas
covered by the VAP, at least two telephones, one of which is manned,
should be connected with each administrative village. The operators can
adopt either wire line or wireless transmission technology to provide
telecommunication service. The terminal can be either fixed or mobile.
These six basic telecom operators may freely negotiate and transfer
28. The State Council of China, Circular on Releasing the Reform Scheme of
Telecommunication System, Guofa [2001] No. 36, Nov.. 14, 2001 (mentioning that China would
set up USF and accelerate the transformation of universal service mechanism). See also Jinliang
Li, Telecommunication UniversalService as a Prerequisitefor Comprehensive Constructionof a

Well-being Society, PEOPLE'S POSTS & TELECOMM. NEWSPAPER (REN MIN You DIAN BAO, CHINA),
Apr. 18, 2003, at A5.
29. See, e.g., Zhigang Chen, Branching Opinions Between MuI and MOF: The
TelecommunicationUniversalServiceFund is in Dystocia, 21 CENTURY ECON. REP. (21 SHIJIJNG
JI BAO DAO, CHINA), Mar. 17, 2004, at A3.
30. MIT, Rural Communications Universal Service-The Implementation of Village Access
Project, Jan. 14, 2004, Preface [hereinafter Rural Communications], http://www.mii.gov.
cn/art/2005/12/29/art_992_4083.html.China's Five-Year Plan aims to determine national critical
projects, manage the distribution of productive forces and individual sector's contributions to

national economy, map the direction of future development, and set up specific targets to be
fulfilled. In 1953, the central government implemented its first five-year plan. Except for a period
of economic adjustment between 1963 and 1965, a total of ten five-year plans have been
implemented to date. The plan for 2006-2010 is the eleventh five-year plan.
31. Id.
3.1-3.2.
32. See NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, China Statistics Yearbook 2006
(abridged),http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexeh.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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assigned tasks among themselves. This permission is conducive to
achieving economically sound outcomes and avoiding the rigidity arising
from the MH's compulsory designation. In order to enhance competition,
no operator is allowed to bar other operators from providing service in the
areas that are originally assigned to it. The connections established in areas
other than those designated ones by a telecom operator also can be
calculated into its final accomplished tasks.33
The administration of VAP is primarily upon the MU while supports
from the local governments are encouraged as well. To ensure the
affordability of telephone services to those rural areas already connected,
MU exercises a price regulation, capping the tariffs of rural services to the
operator's existing pricing schemes.34 The operator should ensure
interconnection made in the VAP with its current networks. Dismantling
or disconnecting such interconnection with any excuse including unpaid
tariffs is prohibited.35
By the end of 2007, 29 out of 31 provinces (excluding Sichuan and
Tibet) fully actualized VAP, hoisting the penetration rate of telephone in
administrative villages to 99.5%. In May 2007, MU formally launched the
project of extending VAP to each natural village and made a breakthrough
within half a year, particularly regarding the rural Internet development.36
In the meantime, VAP further aims to informationalize rural villages and
to attain the goal of town access to Internet within a short period of time.37
3. The Problems and Difficulties Associated with VAP
It is undeniable that VAP has acquired remarkable achievements in
rural telecommunication universal service. It should be noted, however,
the VAP is no more than a stopgap to shrink China's digital divide. By its
own nature, the VAP was minted and conducted under the context where
there is no explicitly defined universal service policy available in China.
The VAP features an administrative allocation and could not be relied
upon as the best way to attain the goal of universal services because of its
incompatibility with market competition and notorious political nature.
33. MII, Rural Communications, supra note 30, 3.3.
34. Id. 4.5.
35. Id. 5.2.
36. MII, The Objective of VAP in 2007 Has Been Satisfactorily Realized, Jan. 7, 2006,
http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/ 2008/01/07/art_989_35757.html.
37. THE ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF CHINA (2006-2010), pt. II, ch. 6, § 1 (providing the establishment of USF, realization of
telephone access in each natural village and Internet access in each town by the end of 2010),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2006-03/16/content_4309517_3.htm, Mar. 16, 2006 (last visited
Jan. 18, 2008).
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This scheme currently seems to be functioning, but that is largely
because political support is crucial to constitute an effective universal
service mechanism, even within a market-based regulatory environment.38
In particular, when the existing framework cannot create a USF, political
invigoration is imperative for six operators to plunge into a program under
the auspice of the Chinese government. 39 After all, the fact that six
operators are all state-owned enterprises (SOEs),4 ° in tandem with
sensitive and opaque government-enterprise relations, renders
administrative designation a workable method to implement universal
service during China's transition from command economy into market
economy.
What cannot be overlooked, however, is that the enforcement of VAP
has not been always satisfactory to MH, especially when some operators
opt to wait and see. In any sense, without an effective supporting and
compensation mechanism,41 the implementation ofVAP is at odds with the
telecom operator's economic interests. Even these telecom operators are
labeled as SOEs, they also are obliged to maximize profits for their
shareholders, including overseas investors.
In addition, the award of USO through a purely administrative order
probably nourishes some hidden problems for the administration of future
policy. For instance, the approach used in task distribution under the VAP
is forging rigidity instead of flexibility with potential detriment to the
competitive provision of telecommunication service. This may pose
practical difficulties and problems for China to further advance USO at its
post-VAP stage. Moreover, even though we could temporarily park the
questioning of political rationales for the VAP, there are still some
problems with regard to what constitutes an economically sustainable
38. See Jennifer A. Manner, Achieving the Goalof UniversalAccessto Telecommunications
Services Globally, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 93-96 (2004).
39. As a matter of fact, VAP acts as a key component of "Three Nongs" issue in China,
which has been put on the top agenda of Chinese government in building "social harmony." "Three
Nongs" refer to the development issues concerning "Agriculture, Villages, and Farmers," these
three words all start with the same "Nong" in Chinese character and pronunciation. See MII, Rural
Communications,supranote 30, Preface (mentioning that VAP is a specific measure to deal with
"Three Nongs" issue).
40. Although China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicorn, and China Netcom list their
parts of shares in overseas stock markets, the largest shareholder is still the State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council, which acts as a
shareholder on behalf of the State.
41. MI does mention that the operators shall be compensated for accomplishment of VAP.
See MII, Circularon SeveralIssues ConcerningOverallPromotionof VAP in 2005, Xin Bu Dian
[2005] No. 55, May 11, 2005, available at http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2005/12/29/art 992
4081_1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008), Part V: Scheme of Subsidy. But the compensation is
subject to the outcome of unknown progress of fundraising thus far.
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universal service regime.42 In the long run, it is predictable that only a USF
coupled with increased market competition, a model adopted by many
countries,4 3 could provide China with the best opportunity to accomplish
universal service. This will be contemplated in Part V in greater detail.
C. UniversalService in TelecommunicationLegislation
China is still in its early stage of regulatory and institutional
transformation of telecommunication service. Due to the lack of relevant
experience and expertise in this area, China unsurprisingly followed a
piecemeal approach in its telecommunication regulation.' That is until the
Regulations on Telecommunication (ROT) was issued in September
2000,4" which is primarily prepared for China's WTO accession and also
viewed as an actual preview of a future comprehensive
Telecommunication Act.
There is only one article in ROT roughly outlining a scheme of
universal service.' This article imposes an explicit and mandatory
universal service obligation on telecommunication operator,47 and
authorizes MU1 to select appropriate operator(s) to assume universal
service tasks through either direct designation or bidding.48 It also
mandates MU, in consultation with the MOF, the National Pricing Board,
to formulate rules on the cost compensation mechanism of universal
service. The rules should be promulgated and implemented subject to the
approval of the State Council.49

42. See Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 10-12.
43. See United States, Canada, Australia, and India, which have comparable land sizes as
China, have set up USF. See Shin-yi Peng, Universal TelecommunicationsService in China: Trade
Liberalization,Subsidy, and Technology in the Making ofInformationEquality in the BroadBand
Era, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 24 (2003).
44. See Theodore Oliver Yee, Price-Cap Regulation: The Answer to China's
Telecommunications Competition Dilemma, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 486-87 (2004).
45. Regulations on Telecommunications of the People's Republic of China, Order No. 291
of the State Council, Sept. 25, 2000, effective Sept. 25, 2000 [hereinafter Regulations on
Telecommunications].
46. Id. art. 44.
47. Id. art. 44(1).
48. Id. art. 44(2).
49. Id. art. 44(3). It is reported that the Bureau of Liquidation under the MII has been taking
the initiative ofdrafting the regulations regarding USF since 2002, which involves funding sources,
ways of fund distribution, project management, cost compensation, project planning, and other
issues. The draft is reportedly to have been sanctioned (though not officially) by the MOF, and
solicited opinions from telecom operators. See Ying Ning, The Ministry of Financehas Formally
Commenced the Work to Establish USF, May 28, 2004, http://www.enet.com.cn/article/2004/
0528/A20040528312307.shtml.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 13

As a matter of fact, the issue of universal service prescribed is rather
imprecisely written in ROT. For one thing, the terms "universal service
obligation" and "cost compensation" are left undefined. Second, it does
not specify the objectives, let alone the support mechanisms and
governance of universal service. As a consequence, the regime of universal
service remains elusive and there is a de facto "regulatory vacuum" in this
regard. Therefore, although telecomm operators are imposed such a
mandatory obligation, none of them cares to fulfill it. Even worse, some
remote areas, which were originally connected, even retrograded to
disconnection when business loss of telecom operators piled up."
It goes without saying that only with a clarified legal framework can
USO be enforced smoothly and regulatory uncertainties reduced.5 In the
meantime, WTO's transparency requirements conclude the history of
China's regulation of telecommunication sector under nebulous
administrative rules even internal red tapes. This holds true as to universal
service as well. Universal service expectedly constitutes one of the points
in the pending Telecommunication Act of China.52 The 2006 version of
Draft Telecommunication Law has a specific chapter on universal service,
explicitly imposing universal service on all operators as an essential
obligation. This chapter prescribes the concept and scope of universal
service, several principles regarding the provision of universal service,
objectives design, mechanism of cost compensation, selection of
providers, cost review, administrative supervision, and other pertinent
matters. Although these provisions ostensibly seem framework-like, they
unprecedentedly iron out more specifics of a universal service regime at
a formal and legislative level. The forthcoming debut of the
Telecommunication Act will undoubtedly ameliorate an overall regulatory
environment, among which universal service mechanism constitutes a
definite part.

50. See Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 7-8.
51. See Tao Lin et at., supranote 20, at 76.
52. Showing the utmost fortitude, the drafting of Telecommunication Law has been
experiencing a rather lengthy and complicated process since 1980. China initiated its effort on
telecommunication legislation in 1984. Due to unpredictable directions of economic reform and
political uncertainty, the process has undergone rise-and-falls for over two decades. To the extent
that this law is so untoward to come out, it draws extensive attention home and abroad. But the
Draft Telecommunication Law has not been publicly available for discussion so far. With view to
a drafting history of Telecommunication Law, see, e.g., Tingshuo Qian, Chinese Government is
Accelerating the Formulation of Telecommunication Law, http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2006-0724/16401052494.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
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III. TOWARD

A PRAGMATIC UNIVERSAL SERVICE FRAMEWORK:
OBJECTIVE, COMPETITION AND TECHNOLOGY

China has been experiencing many rapid changes at various levels in
recent decades. The devise of universal service framework needs to match
with this changing landscape to be pragmatic and enforceable. This section
attempts to examine how the interaction among a doable objective, foreign
participation and technological advancement affects the design of
universal service mechanism in China.
A. The Objective of UniversalService
1. A Dynamic Concept
Universal service may be defined in an essentially analogous way in
different jurisdictions, but a common feature emphasizes the public's
accessibility and affordability of telecommunication service. 3
Nevertheless, universal service is, to a large extent, a sophisticated
construct of social and political forces that respond to a specific set of
economic and technological possibilities. Once these forces or possibilities
alter, the definition of universal service unavoidably is remodeled with
them. 4 Consequently, the very concept of universal service is dynamic and
contingent on the status of a society's particular social, economic and
technological development.5
Telecommunication service historically embraced a limited notion,
referring only to telephone service. The attempt to articulate universal
service goals, however, is complicated by rapidly advancing technologies.
Technological advancement dramatically shifts the range of
telecommunication services available and also lowers the costs at which
they can be supplied. 6 In particular, the technological innovation and
convergence taking place in the end of last century has led to a worldwide
rethinking of whether universal service policy should include broadband
53. See Shin-yi Peng, supra note 43, at 22.
54. See Cherry et al., supranote 2, at 6.
55. For instance, the United States repeatedly has attempted to come up with new definitions
of universal service to respond to ever-advancing technological capabilities and a sense of social
entitlement that advances with them. Id. at 3. Telecommunication Act of 1996 requires universal
service to be an "evolving level of telecommunication services." FCC shall periodically reevaluate
its definition in light of "advances in telecommunication and information technologies."
Telecommunication Act of 1996, Pub. L. No, 104, 11 Stat. 56 (1996), § 254(C). Compare Patricia
M. Worthy, RacialMinoritiesand the Quest to Narrowthe DigitalDivide: Redefiningthe Concept
of "UniversalService, "26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1,3-8 (2003), for a detailed account and
evolution of universal service concept.
56. See Cherry et al., supranote 2, at 5.
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and Internet access,5857 even further, a concept of "universal service with
regard to content.
It is perplexing to find a consensus of what constitutes an essential
package of universal service when a wide array of telecommunication
services is offered. The debate over how universal service should be
defined focuses on the terms and conditions under which specified bundles
of services are made available to end users. 9 Relying heavily on costbenefit analysis, the main point in the discussion about the level of
universal service lies in the price which society is willing and able to pay.6"
Even within the same period, there are substantial disparities as to the
specific scope and goal of universal service in different countries arising
from different developmental levels. Therefore, while developed countries
pursue the universal service with telephone access in every household,
developing countries may target a less resource-intensive model of
universal access, with tele-center as a good example to this end.61
2. Stage-by-Stage Strategy for China
Given the fact that universal service is process-determined, or contextoriented, fundamental economic, political and technological constraints
cannot be ignored in designing an effective objective.62 As indicated
earlier, China is the most populated developing country characterized by
the vast geographical areas, harsh natural conditions in the western
regions, and scanty populations in many rural villages,63 as well as illbalanced levels of telecom development across the country.' With these
57. There have been considerable discussions about the role of broadband networks in
stimulating economic development and whether the time is ripe to include access to broadband
network in universal service in recent years. See, e.g., TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT:
COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND REFORM 42 (Charles B. Goldfarb ed., 2006).
58. See generallyPeggy Valcke, The Futureof Must-Carry:From Must-Carryto A Concept
of Universal Service In the Info-CommunicationsSector, 15 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 247, 249 (2006).
59. See Cherry et al., supra note 2, at 3.
60. See Sawhney Harmeet, Universal Service: Prosaic Motives and Great Ideals, 38 J.
BROADCASTING & ELE. MEDIA 375-77 (1994).
61. According to International Telecommunication Union (ITU), universal service implies
the situation where a telephone has been installed in every household whereas universal access
means everyone may access to telephone services within a reasonable distance in any region. See
Peter Benjamin & Mona Dahms, BackgroundPaperon Universal Service and UniversalAccess
Issue, June 1999, http://cbdd.wsu.edu/edev/edp/benj amin-dahms- I 999.pdf. See alsoManner, supra
note 38, at 91-92. Tele-center model has been successful in some developing jurisdictions to
accomplish universal access. See id. at 102-04.
62. Claire Milne, Stages of Universal Service Policy, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y (UK) 775-80
(1998).
63. See Tao Lin et al., supra note 20, at 16-17.
64. See Taylor, supra note 25, at 18.
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in mind, China deliberately has to set a practical goal of universal service
to shrink its digital divide.
As a matter of principle, the status of social-economic development and
national informationalization strategy are two primary considerations in
determining the objective of universal service in China.65 In particular, the
objective shall be designed to meet two essential criteria. First, it shall
demonstrate a basic level of services that respond to regional uniqueness,
and, therefore, services that fall into the realm of universal service at the
present moment do not have to cover the most advanced ones. Second, the
scope of universal services will be restricted only to those services in the
case of market malfunctions and those that operators do not voluntarily opt
to furnish.66 To put them together, the objective of universal service aims
at providing services to those groups who are underserved or not served at
all within a deregulated Chinese telecommunication market.
Based upon these considerations, together with the social progress and
technological feasibility, China has chosen to follow a stage-by-stage
strategy to deal with its digital inequality. As to the telephone service, the
first stride attempts to achieve the goal of administrative village access.
This is implemented via the VAP and the objective will be ideally reached
by the end of 2007. Subsequently, the short-term objective (by the end of
2010) will extend voice grade access to PSTN available to each natural
village, no matter its geographical location and social-economic standing.
Then a long-term objective (by the end of 2020) is to actualize household
penetration across the country.6 7 With regard to the Internet service, there
are two steps to follow as well. First, each town should be connected to the
Internet by the end of 2010. Second, a long term scheme ensures that each
village is able to access the Internet by 2020.68

65. It shall be emphasized that China has attached much more importance to national
informationalization strategy including the informationalization of rural villages in recent years.
See generally State Council, Some Guidelines on Promotingthe BuildingNew Socialistic Rural
Villages, Dec. 31, 2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-02/2 1/content_
4207811 .htm; see alsoDevelopment Strategy ofNational Informationalization for 2006-2020, May
8, 2006, availableat http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-05/08/content4522878.htm.
66. See Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 13.
67. MII, The Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Information Industry and Middle-Long-Term
Scheme by 2020, Aug. 29, 2006 [hereinafter MII, The Eleventh Five-Year Plan], availableat
http://www.mii.gov.cn/col/col2303/index.html; see also Universal Service and Consumer
Protection--Questingfor A Chinese Answer, special report for joint conference by the MII and
ITU, Aug. 24-25,2005, Objective ofDevelopment, availableat http://www.ccidcom.com/contents/
special/2005/479/index.htm.
68. Id. But along with the mushroom of rural Internet users in the recent two years, this
objective is likely to be reached by 2020. Id.
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In addition to the adoption of an explicit concept of village penetration
for the time being, the objective also responds to the regional unevenness
in another context, primarily as far as the income of each household is
concerned. This leads to a hybrid objective of universal service, meaning
that in most Western and Central regions, the current target is to first
ensure that every village has at least one telephone connected, while in
relatively affluent areas in the Eastern China, the time is ripe to include
household penetration and Internet diffusion.69
The rationale for this stage-by-stage strategy is sensible, especially
when it comes to the cost of rural access and economic sustainability. 70 It
might be interesting to note a wider background for China to formulate this
strategy. As a matter of fact, China is traditionally inclined to set a
concrete target for each specific industry to accomplish via such means as
a Five-Year Plan.71 The telecom industry, a key infrastructure in national
economy, is without an exception. With clear goals in orientation, MUI
develops a more detailed set of measures instructing the operators to
fulfill. Though these guidelines seem to be a legacy of planned economy,
they demonstrate their vitality in present China.
B. Foreign Participationand Universal Service
The long-awaited World Trade Organization (WTO) membership72
urges China to expose its telecommunication market to foreign
competition. The questions raised here is what foreign participation means
to China's scheme ofuniversal service and to what extent this participation
might contribute to bridging the digital gap. After a brief overview of
WTO telecommunication framework and China's commitments, the issue
on how China should respond to the more competitive market and to a
sound universal service scheme will be addressed.

69. For example, Shandong Province, a relatively affluent region in Eastern China, has
achieved the goal of village penetration of broadband and wireless service thus far. See Shandong
Information Industry Bureau, The Broadbandand Mobile Service has Reached Each Village in
ShandongProvince,Dec. 20, 2006, availableat http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2006/12/20/art_2021
27486.html.
70. It is estimated that about USD 20 billion of infrastructure investment is required to
increase rural pre-hundred-households penetration only by an extra 2%, and this amount will reach
USD 2400 billions for household penetration without considering the time consumed. See Jinliang
Li, Wireless Access as the Optimal Technological Means for Rural Areas, PEOPLE'S POSTS &
COMM. NEWSPAPER (China), Apr. 25, 2003, at A4.
71. See supra note 30 (explaining Five-Year Plan in China).
72. Dec. 11, 2001, China legally became the 144th Member of the WTO after 15 years of
negotiation. WTO, Accession of the People'sRepublic of China-DecisionofNov. 10, 2001, WTO
Doc. WT/LJ432, Nov. 23, 2001.
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1. Universal Service in the WTO Telecommunication Framework
WTO embraces a series of instruments on telecommunication service,
including General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS), 73 GATS Annex
on Telecommunication Service,74 the Fourth Protocol to GATS75 and the
Reference Paper on Pro-competitive Regulatory Principles.76
First, GATS contains general principles on trade in services and sets up
for WTO members with a basic tune for telecommunication service.7 7
Recognizing members' different developmental phases and individual
rights to regulate its own services industry, GATS bifurcates members'
obligations into general disciplines and specific commitments.78 Where
this dichotomy applies to telecommunication service, it means that
members undertake commitments not to restrict foreign service and
service providers beyond conditions laid down in their schedules of
specific commitments.79 Second, the Annex on Telecommunication
Service as a whole illustrates WTO's "freer access" policy favoring the
opening of telecommunications services, with the access to and use of
"public telecommunications transport networks and services" as the core
obligation.8 ° Third, GATS Fourth Protocol, the first agreement geared
toward the liberalization of basic telecommunications, has unparalleled
significance regarding its encouragement of worldwide competition and
deregulation of telecom market. 81 Fourth, aiming to bring substantial
transformation into regulatory environment of telecom market,8 2 the

73. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), contained as Annex l(b) to General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-MultilateralTrade Negotiations (The UruguayRound): Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Roundof TradeNegotiations,Dec. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M.
1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
74. GATS Annex on Telecommunication Services, in WTO Agreement, The Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994).
75. Agreement on Telecommunication Services, Attachment of the Fourth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997).
76. Reference Paper to the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Apr. 30, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997) [hereinafter Reference Paper].
77. Tracy Cohen, DomesticPolicyand South Africa's Commitments Underthe WTO's Basic
TelecommunicationsAgreement: Explainingthe Apparent Inertia,4 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 743 (2001).
78. GATS, supranote 73, pt. II GeneralObligationsandDisciplines, arts. II-XV; Id. pt. III
Specific Commitments, arts. XVI-XVIII.
79. Id. art. XVI: 1 (Market Access); id. art. XVII: 1 (National Treatment).
80. GATS Annex on Telecommunication Services, supra note 3, § 2.
81. See Laura B. Sherman, World Trade Organization,Agreement of Telecommunication
Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services), 36 I.L.M. 366-69
(1997) (outlining the fourth protocol).
82. Laura B. Sherman, Wildly EnthusiasticAbout the FirstMultilateralAgreementon Trade
in Telecommunications Services, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 64 (1998).
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guideline,83

Reference Paper, despite an ostensible
lays the most
substantive foundation for designing a template on domestic regulation of
telecommunication service.8 The widespread adoption of these rules by
the WTO members successfully opened 95% of the world market to
competition, arguably the most momentous lubricant to
telecommunications liberalization on a global scale.85
Among these instruments, the Reference Paper directly involves
universal service. Any member has the right to define the kind of universal
service obligation it wishes to maintain. Such obligation will not be
regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided that they are administrated
in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner.86
There is some criticism toward the vagueness of this section and concern
that Reference Paper could not sufficiently deal with the member's
regulation on universal service. Moreover, failure to provide regulatory
specifics may weaken competition or deter foreign participation.87 But
considering the uneven levels of telecom development of the WTO
Members, it is pragmatic to acknowledge the diversity of each member's
implementation of universal service.
2. Foreign Participation in China's Telecommunication Market: A
Changing Front
China has accumulated abundant experiences over availing itself of
foreign investment to boost economic growth in recent decades. Though
China needs a large-scale investment in telecom infrastructure, and foreign
83. The Reference Paper was never formally issued as a WTO document even though fiftyseven countries adopted its principles in their entirety as additional commitments in their schedules
of commitments. Schedules of Commitments & Lists of Article II Exceptions (showing the WTO
Member's schedules of service commitments), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/serve/servcommitmentse.htm (On this web page, please go to "search documents
online" and select a country's name from the menu and click "search," and then all documents
regarding this country's service commitment will display on a separate page) (last visited May 12,
2008).
84. See Laura B. Sherman, Introductory Note to the Fourth Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 36 I.L.M. 355 (1997).
85. For a detailed explanation on WTO telecommunication liberalization, see, e.g., Yun
Zhao, FurtherLiberalizationof Telecommunication Services in the Frameworkof the WTO in the
21st Century, 7 INT'LJ. COMM. L. &POL'Y 25 (2002/2003); see also Krista Schwarting Rose, Note,
Changing Frequencies: The Federal Communications Commission Globalizes the
TelecommunicationsIndustry with the Adoption ofthe WTOAgreement, 8 MINN. J. GLOBALTRADE
189-94 (1999).
86. Reference Paper, supra note 76, § 3.
87. See, e.g., Markus Fredebeul-Krein & Andreas Freytag, The Casefor a More Binding
WTO Agreement on Regulatory Principlesin Telecommunication Markets, 23 TELECOMM. POL'Y
625 (1999).
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capital is readily available, it has adopted a very cautious way to open its
telecom market to foreign participation. In principle, China's investment
strategy in the telecom industry is closely intertwined with national policy.
There is a potential tension between attracting foreign investment and
controlling domestic key industries and infrastructures. s
Historically, China explicitly prohibited foreign investment in
telecommunication service because of a number of reasons, including
national security and sovereignty. 9 The notorious demise of ChineseChinese-Foreign (CCF) scheme, which went through a legal loophole to
sidestep restrictions, may offer an illustration of China's persistence with
this bedrock principle.9" WTO accession, however, renders this landscape
a thing of the past. China has promised unprecedented opening of
telecommunication service to foreign operators. The terms of entry open
the market by allowing as much as 50% foreign ownership in an entity that
provides value-added services. If such an entity provides basic
telecommunication services, foreign ownership in this entity should be no
more than 49%. 9' In order to regulate foreign participation in
telecommunication service, China specifically issued Provisions on the
Administration ofForeign-Invested Telecommunication Enterprises (FITE

88. See Richard Janda, Benchmarking a Chinese Offer on Telecommunications: Context and
Comparisons, 3 INT'L J. CoMM. L. & POL'Y 6-2 (1999) (addressing China's cautious road to
telecommunications liberalizations). Recently China reiterated the stance of national control in
seven key sectors including telecommunication. SASAC of the State Council, State-Owned
Economy Should Continue to Keep Absolute Control in Seven Key Industries, Dec. 18, 2006,
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-12/18/content_ 472256.htm.
89. Despite innumerous criticism, one could not deny that there is a strong natural connection
between national security and telecommunication service, and it holds true for all countries. See
generally James A. Lewis, New Objectivesfor CFIUS: Foreign Ownership, CriticalInfrastructure,
and Communications Interception, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 460 (2005); see also Kathleen A.
Lacey et. al., International Telecommunications Mergers: U.S. National Security Threats Inherent
in Foreign Government Ownership of Controlling Interests, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29,
42-56 (2002); Janda, supra note 88, at 23-26.
90. With respect to more discussions on CCF and foreign investment in China's
telecommunication industry, see Leontine D. Chuang, Comment, Investing in China's
Telecommunication Market: Reflections on the Rule ofLaw and Foreign Investment in China, 20
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 509,516-22 (2000) (analyzing Unicom Case). See also Rachelle B. Chong
& Wendy Chow, Financing Telecommunications Projects in Asia: A Promising Regulatory
Perspective, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 1,4-5, 13-15 (1999) (discussing foreign participation restrictions
and CCF in China).
91. The People's Republic of China, Schedule ofSpecific Commitments, GATS/SCI1 35, Feb.
14, 2002, at 17-20, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/serv-commitments_
e.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) (on this web page, plese go to "search documents online" and
select "China" from the menu and click "search," and then all documents regarding China's service
commitment will display on a separate page).
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Provisions)
on December 11, 2001, the same date as China's WTO
92
accession.
3. Foreign Participation and Universal Service
It is argued that the U.S. experience supports the hypothesis that
telecommunication liberalization, whether in the form of market
competition or privatization, promotes tele-density.93 Yet as commonly
observed, within a competitive environment without government
intervention, operators in pursuit of profit maximizing are inclined to serve
or cream-skimming
the most profitable areas, termed cherry-picking
94
arising out of the market competition.
Foreign capital in telecommunication industry is without exception in
terms of its return-chasing nature. 95 Likewise, as a result of the daunting
regional difference, foreign participation may cast an adverse effect on the
poor by concentrating their efforts on those profitable coastal regions
while ignoring the interior. Furthermore, due to the existence of strong
network externality, those outlying areas in the Western China, such as
Xinjiang, having fewer customers over which to spread fixed costs and
therefore leading to inherently higher service costs, are the least likely to
be served by foreign investors.96 In this sense, the outcome of increased
competition may further asymmetric development and exacerbate
geographical disparities, thereby posing more complex challenges to
reduce the ever-widening spatial inequality.97
China continues to face pressure from the United States to ease its
foreign investment restrictions so as to bolster market opening.98 The
92. See State Council ofChina, TheProvisionson theAdministrationofTelecommunications
Enterpriseswith ForeignInvestment, Decree No. 333, Dec. 11, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002. For
an analysis of the impact of foreign investment on China's telecommunication service, see
generally Jingxia Shi, supranote 22, at 579-612.
93. See, e.g., Shin Cho et al., Competition and Deregulation: An APEC Perspective, in
UNFISHED BusiNEss: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 155, 163-169 (Gary
Hufbauer et al. eds., 1997).
94. See, e.g., BENJAMIN ET AL., supranote 27, at 631-32.
95. See Markus Krajewski, Public Services and Trade Liberalization: Mapping the Legal
Framework,6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 341, 345 (2003). This is often cited as a reason for the persistence
of public monopolies in telecommunication industry, see THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POuCY 350-51 (2d ed. 1998).
96. See Jack Linchuan Qiu, Coming to Terms with Informational Stratification in the
People'sRepublic of China, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (2002) (elaborating on the uneven
access to information in China).
97. Taylor, supra note 25, at 19-23.
98. Letter from Bob Vastine, Coalition of Service Industries, to Timothy Stratford, assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for China, (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.uscsi.org/
publications/papers/China TelDialogue_letter100305.pdf. This letter addressed such issues as
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introduction of foreign competition creates a new set of stakeholders and
more diversified economic interests groups, fashioning a political
consensus on universal service policies is likely to become more
difficult.99
Against this scenario, China has to figure out how to utilize
competition both to maximize rural access and minimize information
inequalities in Western and Central China. The welfare nature of universal
service defines itself as a quasi-public good which cannot be efficiently
supplied if left alone to pure market mechanism.0 Consequently, many
regulatory regimes incorporate access to telecommunication service in
rural and economically disadvantaged regions as a public policy.'01 By the
same token, China is not in a position to rely exclusively on market
mechanisms to elevate its tele-density. Even though increased market
competition is an outgrowth of foreign participation, China should seek to
avoid an uncontrolled phenomenon by advocating an administrative or
institutional regulation. In striving to do this, China needs to mesh WTO
obligation with domestic policy objective in an appropriate way.
C. Technology Choice in UniversalService
If advanced technologies could be used at best, it may offer a country
more choices to bridge its digital divide. Therefore, technological
innovation plays a pivotal role in implementing universal service. While
on the other spectrum, technological progress also may further aggravate
the disparities among different geographical regions and social classes at
a faster speed.0 2 These arguments, together with the requirement of
technology neutrality and the issuance of 3G licenses, render the
realization that universal service is more complicated in China.

elimination of capitalization restrictions, market access for resale services, broaden concept of
value added services, establishment of an independent and impartial telecom regulator, and
issuance of China's Telecom Bill). See also U.S. Trade Representative (USTR): 2007 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance, Dec. 11, 2007, at 96-98 availableat http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports Publications/2007/asset upload file625_ 13692.pdf.
99. Cherry et al., supra note 2, at 5.
100. See Jun Xia, Telecommunication UniversalServicePolicy: China vs. Western Countries,
14 WORLD TELECOMM. 9 (2001).
101. Lucien Rapp, PublicService and UniversalService?, 20 TELECOMM. POL'Y(_JK) 391-94
(1996).
102. See Shin-yi Peng, supra note 43, at 28 (arguing that to some extent, the gap in the
availability of Internet access will have a multiplier effect and create an even more significant
divide in critical areas).
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1. Choices of Technology: Cost v. Benefit?
Given the constraints arising from the harsh conditions particularly in
Western China, appropriate network technology and transmission means
are key elements to achieving the goal of universal services. To date,
although not a single access technology is proven perfect for rural
communication, there has been a tendency for operators to choose wireless
access primarily because of the cost-effectiveness exhibited by mobile
technologies.1"3 For those outlying areas with even lower population
density, other technologies including satellite transmission, as a
complement, have been sought to serve the purpose and are permitted by
MU if they prove to be indispensable."
The choice of technology raises not only the issue of cost and benefits,
but also other concerns. In particular, despite the principle of technological
neutrality,"0 5 the choice of technology in China is largely determined by
two factors: the availability from the operators' existing technology
portfolio and the government's preference toward certain technologies.'16
The former expedites the process of providing universal service and in one
way or another might be justified while the government intervention in the
latter form may trigger potential trade disputes within the WTO framework
in the future. For instance, to cover the cost from utilizing satellite
technology, operators need to import equipment and rent satellite relay
capacity, thereby introducing more market opportunities for foreign
corporations. Nevertheless, operators are not always free to choose
whatever technologies they deem appropriate in building rural networks
as MU explicitly encourages operators to adopt certain technologies with
domestic proprietary intellectual property. 7
Given that nurturing of innovative ability of domestic enterprises
becomes a part of national strategy, China attaches more importance to the
103. See Jinliang Li, supra note 70.
104. See Chunhua Yao, Satellite Communication Is A Good Solution for Remote Village
Access, 19 WORLD TELECOMM. 19-21 (2006).
105. Technical neutrality is advocated in most countries. See Manner, supra note 38, at 91-92.
See also ITU, Global Symposium for Regulators, UniversalAccess Regulatory Best Practices
Guideline, Dec. 8-9, 2003, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR03/
Documents/bestpractices 3 1.pdf.
106. Regarding the selection of technology in the implementation of VAP, the first priority
should be given to those eligible for the effective extension of existing networks of operators,
therefore avoiding incompatibility among different norms as well as making human and
organizational skills accumulated with current technologies more transferable for rural applications.
See MII, Rural Communications,supra note 30, 4.3 (addressing technical means in the VAP).
107. Id. SCDMA 400 MHz may serve as an example in this regard. Commercially deployed
in 2004, it is vowed as a solution specifically designed for rural communications. Top officials from
the MII often recommend operators to use this technology as it is both effective and domestically
developed. See Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supranote 15, at 16.
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realization of technologic breakthroughs of independent IP in
telecommunication industry.10 8 But taking a forward-looking perspective,
competitively technical neutrality has to be honored eventually, either as
China's stance toward its WTO commitments or as a means to foster
corporate competitiveness of domestic operators.
2. Wireless Technology and Leapfrogging Policy
China is the fastest growing cellular phone market in the world. 9
Mobile service is hailed as a "crown jewel" with a huge market potential
and the highest revenue generator." 0 As widely pointed out, the cycle of
network construction and maintenance cost hold the key to the
implementation of universal service. Wire-line technologies are often
pricey in rural access while wireless communication technically enjoys
such advantages as short construction phase, network design flexibility,
low operational expenses, and wide coverage. Wireless technology,
therefore, is claimed as the ultimate savior of universal service in those
harsh territories."' In practice, China Mobile, the country's largest
wireless operator, has set its sights on the less-developed regions and
undertook most parts of the VAP tasks. All these shed light on the
popularity of wireless technology as the optimal means to extend universal
service to scattered rural areas and also solicit discussions on leapfrogging
strategy in China.
Interestingly, there are various pro and cons over the possibility of
leapfrogging strategy. Advocators argue that leapfrogging supports the
theory of technology acting as a cyber-cel connector. A well-defined
policy promoting the build-out of wireless infrastructure will bring both
telephone use (cel) and the Internet (cyber) to remote rural areas faster
than wireline." 2 At the same time, Internet access can facilitate closer
integration among different regions in China and allows underserved areas
to catch up with their developed peers. Therefore, if wireless technologies
are more well-suited to rural access, China is in position to pursue

108. See MII, The Eleventh Five-Year Plan,supra note 67. See also State Council of China,
Development Planfor Handling IntellectualPropertyRights, Aug. 22, 2006, pt. 9 (talking about
enforcing enterprises IPR work and help more businesses own their own brands and IPR as well
as international advantages), availableat http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish/laws/developing/
dphipr/.
109. See Marc Laperrouza & Yves Pigneur, China's Broadband Wireless Industry-A
Prospective Approach, http://www.hec.unil.ch/yp/Pub/04-PACIS.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2008)
(for a comprehensive overview of wireless technology developments in China).
110. See Abramson, supra note 18, at 35.
111. See Lee, supra note 13, at 15.
112. See Abramson, supranote 18, at 2.
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leapfrogging policy, using wireless technology
to make strides toward
3
universal service and shrink digital gap. 1
Despite this hilarious prophesier, it is also a concern that an undeniable
reality may dampen this optimistic thinking on technological
empowerment in the country toward leapfrogging strategy. "4 Although the
Internet is consistently touted as the "newest educational tool," the income
and education levels determine the extent of technology access." 5 To a
large extent, the problem itself is not information haves versus have-nots,
but rather "cans" and "cannots." ' 6 Long-standing poor conditions deprive
rural peoples of the education opportunity and render the orientations of
rural dwellers toward adopting new technologies rather passive as opposed
to urban dwellers. This technology exclusion reduces their capacity to
benefit from society and economy in the digital era.
As a matter of fact, wireless technology presents a bright avenue to
providing the backbone necessary to bring data services into remote areas,
and, hence, China should take a chance to pursue leapfrogging policy. To
this end, encouraging wireless infrastructure outgrowth and fueling foreign
capital into the updated generation of technology may serve as an efficient
resource allocation. At the same time, however, the implementation of
leapfrogging, at its core, concerns a systematic exaltation of economic and
educational level rather than mere technological access in uncultured
areas. In order to be primed to leapfrog, China first has to posit a linkage
between universal service and a more overall objective of development in
those regions.
3. 3G License Issuance and Universal Service
The growth of third generation wireless system (3G technology) is
fostering a synergy between wireless innovation and Internet revolution.
The increase in 3G capacity has a profound bearing on the communication
network.' Among other things, 3G technologies requiring less terrestrial
infrastructure than wired broadband could offer a golden opportunity for
countries with low rates of wireline telephone/Internet penetration to
actively participate in information society and supply an economically
sound means to narrow the digital divide. It is therefore argued that once

113.
114.
115.
116.
It is 'can'
117.

Id. at 35-36.
See Shin-yi Peng, supranote 43, at 28.
See NTIA, supra note 6.
"In the information age----, if you don't have a computer, it is not 'have' and 'have not.'
and 'can not."' David B. Bolt & Ray A.K. Crawford, DIGrrAL DIVIDE 119 (2000).
See Christopher J. Banks, The Third Generation of Wireless Communications: The

IntersectionofPolicy, Technology, and PopularCulture, 32 LAW&POL'YINT'LBus. 585 (2001).
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3G technology matures, it is more likely that the vision of universal
service will finally be actualized in China.'
China is actively involved in the ITU's 3G standard-setting process. In
March 2002, ITU accepted TD-SCDMA, created and owned by a Chinese
company, as one of three standards for 3G technology. Partly because of
this domestically proprietary IP standard, recent years have witnessed that
China's 3G license issuance is one of the most controversial issues,
highlighting a salient conflict between protection of national industry and
international advocation of technical neutrality." 9 Though this clash goes
beyond the realm of this Article, questions such as when to issue a license,
how many licenses shall be issued, and to whom and how the 3G license
shall be issued, are pertinent to the crafting of a universal service system.
A proposal is that China may connect the allocation of 3G licenses with
USO of operators. Given the astronomical business accruals gestated by
3G operation in the tremendous Chinese market, the license gainer might
be charged with the corresponding USO. This can be done by the way of
imposing conditions on all operators in the license awarding to achieve an
equitable outcome. 2 ° By any means, if China is ready to launch 3G, taking
advantage of license issuance as an optimal occasion to boost its universal
service might be a wise choice.
IV. UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND AS FINANCING MECHANISM
Through an economic prism, the cost of providing universal services
is high whereas the market of rural demand for telecommunication
118. See Shin-yi Peng, supra note 43, at 47-48.
119. In particular, there were two hot topics in China's telecom industry through 2005 into
2007: the awarding of 3G licenses and the restructuring of operators, which closely intertwined
with each other. In early 2006, the MII selected China Telecom, China Netcom, and China Mobile
to build out pre-commercial TD-SCDMA networks across the country, which reinforced the belief
that the two giant fixed-line operators-China Telecom and China Netcom-might be awarded 3G
licenses, thereby making it imperative for China to move on a new round of restructuring of the
industry. See Wuyang You, 3G: Taking up toReshapeA FairEnvironmentforMarket Competition,
PEOPLE'S POST & TELECOMM. NEWSPAPER, June 15, 2006. Moreover, the MII made commitments
to provide 3G wireless service in 2008 Beijing Olympics. So it is argued that the time is ripe to
issue license as late as early 2007 in order for the operator to have sufficient time to prepare the
network ready for use. See, e.g., Liao Qi, The Restructuringof Telecommunication Industry is
Unavoidable with 3G License Issuance, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/it/txxw/
news/2006/12-22/842171.shtml. But the author observed that since the rewarding of 3G licenses
is still subject to various arguments in China, it has remained mysterious when and how to issue
the licenses and a new round of restructuring could happen.
120. See Hongfeng Zheng, An Examination of Universal Service within Market Mechanism,
16 WoRLDTELEcoMM. 21 (2003) (arguing USF is not enough to resolve universal service issue and
China shall bundle the allocation of telecommunication resource with the USO).
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services is relatively modest, a scenario that can be attributable to a
spectrum of factors including economic, technological, natural,
educational, and cultural elements. 2 ' This subsequently generates a major
disincentive for operators to provide universal service. Therefore, China
should figure out a sustainable supporting mechanism for USO costs.
Universal service fund (USF), more in line with the principles of fairness,
transparency, and competition-compatible,' 22 is on track to be introduced
in China and the relevant specifics are being sketched. These fall into the
realm of discussion in this section.
A. USF in China: Necessity, Feasibility,andDifficulty
Now that cross-subsidization embedded with monopoly has lost its
functionality within a competitive environment, a new financing
instrument has to be located to suit the need. International experiences
demonstrate that when competition fosters affordability by reducing the
costs in profitable areas, USF can assist in extending basic services to
unprofitable rural areas.' 23 Many countries, including the United States,
Brazil, and South124Africa, use USF as the main support instrument to
universal service.

USO has thus far not been set up in China, largely due to the failure to
craft a feasible funding mechanism. USF, as a vexed subject, has long
been a political, industrial, and academic limelight, and the relevant
debates are abundant in supply. The initial contention dates back to 1998
when China started to deregulate its telecommunication service. After the
promulgation of the first-ever Regulations on Telecommunication in 2000,
121. For example, rural telephone traffic in China is mainly generated from local-calls instead
of long-distance calls. Many subscribers have only made calls within the limitation of free-calls
coming with the monthly access charge. Unsurprisingly, the average number of inbound-calls is
several times larger than that of out-bound calls in rural areas. Many rural dwellers treat telephone
call merely as an expense. Those households who do choose to have a telephone installed where
possible mainly expect calls from their family members working in the cities. See Jun Xia & Tingjie Lu, supra note 15, at 8.
122. See Tao Lin et al., supra note 20, at 46.
123. Seegenerally OECD, UniversalService Obligationsin Competitive Telecommunications
Environment (1995) (offering a comprehensive examination of USF), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/26/2349175.pdf(last visited Feb. 2,2008). See also Shin-yi Peng,
supranote 43, at 29 (arguing that a strategy combining increased competition with USF conforms
to the requirements from WTO Reference Paper).
124. For instance, the U.S. Congress established USF under 47 U.S.C. § 254. Pursuant to
subsection (d), this statute requires telecommunication carriers to contribute money to a common
account used to promote equal distribution of telecommunication service to all parts of the United
States. At the same time, the United States created an explicit Federal Universal Service Fund
(FUSF) funding mechanism to provide a significant portion of total universal service subsidies. See
Glodfarb, supra note 57, at 42.
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China formally imposed USO upon telecom operators. 125 The funding
mechanism has, from then on, become a spotlight in the
telecommunication policy arena,1 26 and intensive discussions can be found
in various media coverage with a wide range of consensus from the
government agencies, telecom industry as well as research circles
regarding the establishment of USF. In addition to the compatibility of
USF with competition, these favorable attitudes also reflect other
considerations. For instance, USF lends itself to China's transition to a
fully rebalanced rate structure and, therefore, stifling price distortion and
helping to maintain a healthy market order.'27 The zest for USF has hoisted
even more with the kick-off of the VAP in early 2004 when funding for
this project appeared as a bottleneck to advance rural service.
In the meantime, given China's telecom industry leading a vigorous
rise and yielding much more profits as opposed to other sectors, the
introduction of USF is feasible and operational so long as the mechanism
could be schemed out soon.
Despite the various favorable opinions and operators' economic
strength toward establishing USF in China, an array of arguments still
exists on such aspects as the contribution, distribution and regulation of the
Fund. The primary complications can be boiled down to the perceived
excessive regulatory cost arising from accounting and duplicate
administrative activities. It would not be easy for MI to evaluate the cost
of providing universal service with the asymmetric information and the
shortage of suitable cost modeling. Thus, arbitrary subjectivity may be
inevitable and fairness is hard to ensure as has been demonstrated in the
task assignments of VAP. 128 Challenges also result from the uncertainties
associated with regulatory vagueness across the sector. Policymakers face
a trade-off between regulatory convenience and regulatory cost, which is
often ignored under soft-budget constraints. 29 In addition, fairness and
transparency, efficiency and low enforcement cost also need to be taken
125. See supra note 45-49 and the accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., supra note 28. This Circular first addressed the establishment of USF in the
publicly available document.
127. See J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Uberregulation Without Economics: The World
Trade Organization'sDecision in the US-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunication Services, 57
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 21 (2004). Indeed, in a developing country like China, understanding how to
regulate the rate for basic telecommunication service is even more challenging because they lack
the experience and expertise of regulating utilities in a competitive market environment. Id.
128. In the implementation of VAP, the M11 first calculated a proportion on the basis of
business income of six operators at the end of 2002 and other economic indexes and then assigned
the total tasks in accordance with this proportion. But because of the different natural conditions
among different areas, and the resulting different level of difficulty in connecting a telephone, this
method is unlikely to yield a fair outcome.
129. See Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 19-20.
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into account in designing USF as the support instrument of realizing
universal service.
B. The Contributionof USF
As a method of payment transfer, USF embraces a policy of income
rebalancing through which the subsidies from the rich or the population in
urban areas to the poor or the population in rural areas can be realized.
From this perspective, USF can come from various channels, including
government finance, collection from operators, spectrum and number
appropriation fees, auction of licenses, and other means. Most countries
choose to levy upon telecom operators as the main source of funding with
a view to its continuity, sustainability and compatibility with competitive
neutrality. General tax revenue13 ° and government finance, however, on
occasions can be an expedient complement.131
1. Who Should Contribute to USF
The contribution to USF is closely related with the interests of market
participants. Theoretically, all players in the telecom market are obliged
to contribute to USF. Nonetheless, along with technological advancement
and market fractionization, the issue on who should contribute to USF has
become complicated. For instance, as the IP-enabled network platforms
evolve and compete, how should the public goal of universal service be
met? Is a policy based on the category of operators or the service
classification desirable? Should local services and IAPs (Internet Access
Providers) and competitive new entrants contribute? In the United States,
much doubt has been recently cast on whether the current version of the
federal universal service program can be sustained. Declining supplies of
revenues, from which the fees are collected, and increasing demands for
the fees that remain are identified as the immediate problem.'32 A proposal
130. It is argued that since universal service is a subsidy program intending to benefit all
sectors and segments of the population, it should be funded from general tax revenues. See
Glodfarb, supranote 57, at 47.
131. For example, in addition to the Federal Universal Service Fund, there are a number of
federal programs trying to foster the deployment of broadband networks and services in the United
States. See Lennard G. Kroger & Angele A. Gilroy, Broadband Internet Access and the Digial
Divide: Federal Assistance Progams, CRS Report RL 30719, Jan. 17, 2006, available at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data//2006/upl-meta-crs-8576/RL30719_2006Jan 1 7.pdf.
This Article also provides a good discussion of these programs.
132. On the supply side, the method by which universal service is funded through fees
collected from the revenues of local and long distance wireline and wireless carriers, is being
undermined partly by wireless competition, the growing use of e-mail, and all distance service
bundling. On the demand side, increasing requirements on the high cost fund by
telecommunications carriers and continuing requirements for funding of social inclusion subsidies
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thus tabled is to impose the duty of contributing to the USF on IP-enabled
network providers.
Free from these debates, there is a consensus in China to limit the levy
to the service providers while excluding equipment manufacturers standing
at the top of the telecom industry chain and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), Internet Content Providers (ICPs) and other value-added service
providers standing at the bottom of the chain.1 33 In light of the current
market structure, all six licensed basic telecom operators should contribute
to the USF as required by the Regulations on Telecommunication.' 34
It should be emphasized that the mechanism for collecting USF intends
to ensure equitable and nondiscriminatory treatment to all telecom
operators. Taking the possibility of new market entrants into account,
particularly those potential Sino-foreign telecomjoint ventures in the wake
of WTO accession, it seems necessary to clarify that despite a disincentive
for foreign participation, China shall exert equal USO on all operators so
long as they engage in basic service and secure the profits from this
market. But it is possible that, subject to approval from MII, new entrants
and vulnerable competitors might be temporally waved USO to enhance
market competition in the telecommunication industry.
2. The Assessment of Contribution Factor
In general, as a basis for assessing the contribution of operators to USF,
the contribution factor is calculated in accordance with the cost of
universal service and general revenue of the telecommunications market
in a given fiscal year or quarter. But the difficulty here may lie in
establishing a scientific percentage because neither the cost of universal
service nor the revenue scope can be identified easily in China. For
example, with respect to the identification of revenue, which is subject to
contributing to the USF, despite the recognition that the revenue should
come from public telecommunication service market, it is still difficult for

for indigent, school-age, and rural American combine to place increasing strain on the funding
process. See Allen S. Hammond IV, Universal Service: Problems, Solutions, and Responsive
Policies, 57 FED. CoMM. L.J. 187, 188-90 (2005); see also Glodfarb, supra note 57, at 44-45.
133. Several reasons can be identified to account for this practice: first, it is hard to distinguish
between the telecom manufacturers and other producers; second, the burden on telecommunication
services would eventually be transferred by service providers to manufacturers and consumers, the
incidence of the levy would therefore be shared by service providers, manufacturers, and
consumers. See June Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 20. In addition, I also suggest that valueadded service providers are generally in small-scale and need policy support to secure growth at
their early stage. In addition, their profits are relatively low and therefore the amount they could
contribute to the USF is rather limited.
134. See supra note 45-49 and accompanying text.
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MII to determine each operator's genuine revenue
due to asymmetric
35
information and weak regulatory competence.1
Another problem is how to achieve a fair result in determining the
contribution factor for different operators. Ostensibly, the fairness
principle means that each operator should contribute to the USF based on
the same contributing factor. But given China's unique telecommunication
development history, this may inflict substantial inequity among telecom
operators. Though six operators are currently all state-owned enterprises,
their resource of initial capital,
licensed business scope, and profit-gaining
136
ability are very different.
Under this context, if the new operators, China Satcom and China
Railcom, are subject to the same contribution factor regardless of the
amount of their business revenue, they are likely to be deprived of the
momentum for further development and growth. Consequently, in addition
to an adjustable contribution factor based on the cost of universal service
in different periods, working out a variable factor adjustable with
operators' business volume and revenue bases seems a necessity as well.
This further complicates the issue and deserves more seasoned
intelligence.
C. The Distributionof USF
Given the positive externality of telecom consumption on community
development, rural communities would become better off as a whole if the
subsidies are directly transferred into this consumption.' To ensure real,
rural consumption, USF ought to be distributed to those eligible providers
that provide eligible services. Further, given that eligible service is closely
related with the scope and objective of universal service addressed
135. A contribution factor ranging from 1%to 3% of general revenue of overall income from
public telecommunication service market is suggested to be appropriate in China. See Jun Xia &
Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 20. China's telecom section earned revenues of over 97 billion US$
in 2007. See MII, supra note 7. Assuming the contribution factor is set at 2%, USF can collect
about 2 billion US$ per year based on the current market dimension, and is able to cover the most
compensation for rural service.
136. Due to the historical reasons, the incumbent China Telecom enjoyed national preferential
policy and long-term monopolized status, which accumulated a high market share for it. On the
contrary, such new operators as China Satcom and China Railcom emerging from several rounds
of telecomm restructuring, lack these advantages and have a limited market share and even a
substantial loan burden. This leads to an obvious difference with regard to the profit margin among
six operators ranging from the highest 20% to the lowest 1%. See, e.g., Jianchao Li, Summary of
2006 Four Telecom Operator'sSemi-Annual Report and Prospectfor Future Trends, Sept. 12,
2006, http://news.ccidnet.com/art/1032/20060912/898205_1 .html. In addition, China still needs to
take measures to shape a real and effective competition pattern in the telecomm market. Id.
137. Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 21.
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above,13

it is necessary to discuss the selection of service providers and
some special problems associated with the USF distribution.
1. The Selection of Service Providers
The selection of providers of universal service, also referred to as the
awarding of USO, determines who is going to provide universal service
and qualify to receive subsidies from the USF. Generally there are two
ways in awarding USO to appropriate operators: direct designation and
market competition, which includes the auction and bidding process. 139 At
the present time, the VAP tasks are directly assigned by ME to six
incumbent operators. This awarding mechanism is somewhat effective and
probably more pragmatic under the current regulatory regime, taking into
account present economic and political climate in China. 140 But by and
large, direct designation shall be a mere interim solution in awarding USO,
largely because of its arbitrary nature and incompatibility with competition
and transparency requirements.
China needs to take a forward-looking vision in awarding USO as the
telecom reform unfolds and progresses. I argue that an auction mechanism
or bidding process is, in the long run, the best way of choosing providers
of universal service. For one reason, these means better reflect market laws
and serve for competitive neutrality and transparency. In the meantime,
from an economic perspective, bidding and auction are better ways by
which market participants can inform regulators of information regarding
the provision of universal service. As a general rule, when the regulator
determines the providers of universal service, it needs to accumulate the
cost and benefit information in order to select suitable providers.
Nonetheless, the regulator is often less knowledgeable about real
information than the operators in practice. Auction or bidding can, to some
degree, supply this gap and alleviate the problem of asymmetric regulatory
information.
Bidding includes open bidding and invited bidding. The latter is more
appropriate because telecommunication service involves the construction
of critical national infrastructure and the provision of basic service
138. See supra Part III.A (Objective of Universal Service).
139. Regulations on Telecommunications, supra note 45, art. 40. It shall be noted that auction
and bidding are two different means to actualize fair market competition and they are subject to
different laws in China. See Zhao Biao Tou Biao Fa [hereinafter Law on Tender and Bidding]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 1999, effective Jan. 1,2000);
Pai Mai Fa [Law on Auction] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 5,
1996, as amended on Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004).
140. Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, supra note 15, at 21-22.
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indispensable with people's daily life. 4 ' Despite the advantages of bidding
or auction, one problem might arise here. Considering the economic nature
of universal service, it is likely that no operator bids or attends auction.
When this situation does takes place, direct designation can be an
alternative.' 42
2. The Problems Associated with the Distribution of USF in China
USF gives compensation to eligible universal service providers. The
amount of compensation is calculated on the basis of net cost, usually
amounting to the difference between the revenues from providing such
services and the costs actually incurred.' 43 In China, the cost of providing
rural services basically falls into three parts: historical cost, infrastructure
commitments, and maintenance expenses.'" These three parts are
interdependent in affecting the provision of rural services. In most rural
regions, infrastructures built prior to 1998 become obsolete and require
substantial maintenance and replacement fees before they completely
break down. Some rural areas originally connected by the former CT are
now disconnected because of an avowed funding shortage for needed
maintenance. In comparison, the demand from infrastructure investment
would have a greater impact on new initiatives of village access, as
operators are complaining of connecting without funding support.
However, the availability of services after rural connection has been made
however, would rely on reasonable maintenance fees.'4 5

141. By this way, the regulator first qualifies the eligibility of potential bidders prior to the
commencement of formal bidding process. Then these eligible operators are invited to bid for
providing universal services in certain areas. Law on Tender and Bidding, supra note 139, art. 10.
In fact, China once employed auction to allocate 3.5GHz broadband wireless access in 2003 and
acquired some experience in this regard. Id.
142. For instance, in the United States, if no carrier is willing to provide universal service
supported by federal universal service support mechanisms to an unserved community or portion
thereof, the eligible carrier is to be designated for interstate purposes by the FCC and for intrastate
purposes by the state commission. 1996 Telecommunication Act, § 214(e)(3).
143. See Tao Lin et al., supra note 20, at 46.
144. Historical cost refers to the cost inherited from former China Telecom when it was a
monopoly in the wireline market and undertook the task of promoting rural access through crosssubsidization before 1998. This part of cost is now borne by new China Telecom and China Netcom
after former CT was split in 2002: Infrastructure investment refers to the investment committed in
rural telecom infrastructure after the market restructuring in 2002, especially after the VAP was
launched in 2004. Cost involved in the maintenance of network also accounts for a substantial
proportion of funding demand. See Wuyang You & Xiufeng Zhang, ProfoundAnalysis-Examining
Telecommunication Universal Servicefrom An EquitableInformation Society, http://www.btxxb.
gov.cn/ArticlePrint.asp?ArticlelD=3420.
145. See Jun Xia & Tingjie Lu, supranote 15, at 21.
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These three parts are competing for the USF, which may not be enough
to satisfy them all. Questions presented here involve what part of costs is
to be recovered, how to calculate the percentage, and whether the potential
benefit of providing universal services have to be considered if applicable.
In this regard, Australia and the U.K. are two of the pioneers in modeling
net universal service cost as direct costs minus benefits. But according to
current practice, the implementation of VAP has not brought much benefit
to the operators thus far. This, as well as the issue of asymmetric
information between the MII and telecom operators, makes the use of this
model far from being practical in China. It also is recommended that the
USF primarily be used to cover basic infrastructure investment while
excluding terminals that are supposed to be undertaken by the telecom
operators. 146
These recommendations obviously could not respond to all issues
presented here. In general, the distribution of USF is another unsettled
problem. Like the contribution of USF, the distribution also needs a
sophisticated model built to evaluate the cost and benefit. The
collaborations from telecom operators in providing relevant information
proved to be an arduous task as indicated earlier. In this respect, not only
should China borrow experiences of other countries as reference, it should
figure out an adaptive mechanism to effectively address its historical
legacy issues, current market structure, priority of universal service, and
promotion of competition as well.

V. CONCLUSION

China realizes that the accessibility, affordability, and availability of
telecommunication services hold the key to bettering the lives of more
than 1.3 billion Chinese people in an information age. Unsurprisingly,
narrowing digital divide to create a harmonious society has become a
shared belief in China. But in comparison with full-blown mechanisms in
developed countries, public concerns and debates on universal services are
merely events of recent years in China. 147 Consequently, while consensus
has been reached on the necessity to provide universal service, its specifics
are yet to be ironed out.

146. The proposal of partial, instead of full subsidy, is out of the consideration of implicit
benefits received by providing rural services due to network externality. Partial subsidy also
embraces the principle of risk sharing and incentive compatibility that would encourage operator's
efforts to improve efficiency. Id. at 20.
147. See Jun Xia, Telecommunication UniversalServicePolicy: Chinavs. Western Countries,
14 WORLD TELECOMM. 4-5 (2001).
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Crafting a feasible system is not an easy mission for Chinese
government to fulfill since universal service policies are conceived of as
time-dependent outcomes of a process driven and constrained by social,
economic, and technological forces. As discussed in this Article, the
unique circumstances surrounding China are presently characterized by
such factors as domestic telecom reform, outside pressures to further open
market to competition, explosive technological innovations and historical
legacy inherited from monopoly era. All these factors complicate the
issues and need to be fully considered in designing China's universal
service policies and mechanisms.
It shall be emphasized that though the policy goal of universal service
can be pursued through an array of approaches in China, including crosssubsidization and VAP, the long term resolution rests with how to strike
a balance between market efficiency with increased competition and social
equity with universal service available. To this end, I argue that
establishing competitive-neutral USF and a fair USO mechanism, through
which telecom operators can undertake their social responsibility, shall be
of paramount significance for China to make the grade on a harmonious
information society.

